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Christensen: Criminal Law - The Wyoming Supreme Court's Confusion on Voluntary

CASE NOTE
CRIMINAL LAW—The Wyoming Supreme Court’s Confusion on
Voluntary Act: Automatic Jury Instruction on the Voluntary Act
Requirement?; Seymore v. State, 152 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2007).
"IRTHE 3 #HRISTENSEN

INTRODUCTION
During a hearing for a felony conviction, the judge placed the defendantappellant, Brian Seymore, in detention with Frontier Corrections System (“FCS”).1
Under FCS rules, a failure to return to FCS at the required time constitutes
escape.2 On July 2, 2004, Seymore left the facility at 5:00 p.m., but failed to
return as required by 10:00 p.m.3 Aware of his violation, Seymore attempted
to turn himself in the following morning; however, the jail refused to take him
without an arrest warrant.4 About a month-and-a-half later, authorities arrested
Seymore and charged him with escape.5 Following trial, a jury found Seymore
guilty of escape.6
The escape statute, which Seymore allegedly violated, makes no reference to
a mens rea requirement and simply describes the offense of escape.7 Consequently,

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2010.
1

Seymore v. State, 152 P.3d 401, 403, 405 (Wyo. 2007). The Frontier Corrections facility
detaining Seymore is an “adult community corrections facility.” )D at 405. Such a facility
provides housing and case management services for probationers, parolees,
inmates, and Intensive Supervision Program violators who are administratively
sanctioned by Field Services to participate in the ACC program as an alternative
to probation or parole revocation. The facilities provide the courts, Parole Board,
and the WDOC an alternative to incarceration or traditional probation/parole
supervision and they provide a transition option for inmates who are preparing to
reenter Wyoming communities.
Department of Corrections, available at http://corrections.wy.gov/services/adult.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2009).
2

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 403.

3

)D

4

)D

5

)D

6

)D

7

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 404. The Wyoming escape statute provides that:
(a) An offender, parolee or an inmate is deemed guilty of escape from ofﬁcial
detention and shall be punished as provided by W.S. 6-5-206(a)(i) if, without proper
authorization, he: (i) Fails to remain within the extended limits of his conﬁnement
or to return within the time prescribed to an adult community correctional facility
to which he was assigned or transferred; or (ii) Being a participant in a program

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2009

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 9 [2009], No. 2, Art. 9

626

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 9

the trial judge did not instruct the jury as to the mens rea requirement and the jury
found Seymore guilty of escape without considering intent.8 On appeal, Seymore
argued reversible error occurred when the trial judge did not instruct the jury on
the mens rea element of the crime of escape and speciﬁcally argued the trial judge
failed to instruct the jury on the “speciﬁc intent element of escape.”9
First, the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed this case under the plain error
standard because Seymore did not object to the jury instructions at trial.10 Second,
the court disagreed with Seymore’s argument regarding the trial court’s exclusion
of a speciﬁc intent element in the jury instructions, because escape is a general
intent crime, and not a speciﬁc intent crime.11 Nevertheless, the court found the
jury instructions inadequate because even for a general intent crime the state must
prove the voluntariness of the actor’s criminal conduct.12 The court held the state
was required to prove whether Seymore had voluntarily failed to return to FCS.13
established under the provisions of this act he leaves his place of employment or
fails or neglects to return to the adult community correctional facility within the
time prescribed or when speciﬁcally ordered to do so.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-18-112 (West 2008). The Wyoming Supreme Court further articulated that
“[m]ens rea is the state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a
defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness.” Seymore, 152 P.3d at 405
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (8th ed. 2004)).
8

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 405.

9

)D. at 405–06.

10

)D at 404. The court applies the plain error standard when an appellant fails to object
to the jury instructions at trial, or when an appellant requests for “a certain instruction [to] be
included.” )D In order to prevail under the plain error standard the Wyoming Supreme Court
considers three elements:
First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second,
appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated
in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that
he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him.
)D
11

)D at 406. The Wyoming Supreme Court explained general and speciﬁc intent crimes as

follows:
When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular
unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future
consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do
the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory deﬁnition
of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional
consequence, the offense is considered to be a speciﬁc intent crime and then that
question must be asked of the jury.
)D
12
)D (quoting Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 1999)) (stating “even a general intent
crime requires a showing that the prohibited conduct was undertaken voluntarily”).
13

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 406. Speciﬁcally, the court stated
The law of intent, as applied to the facts of this case, required the State to
prove that the appellant voluntarily failed to return to FCS at the required time.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court came to this conclusion because the court
equated voluntariness with mens rea and noted that every crime generally contains
two essential elements: actus reus and mens rea.14 Failure to instruct the jury on
an essential element of the crime constitutes a “fundamental error” and requires
reversal.15 Accordingly, the state must prove, and the trial judge must instruct
on, the essential element of voluntariness; otherwise, the court will overturn
the conviction.16 Consequently, Seymore implicitly stands for the requirement
of an automatic jury instruction on voluntariness in each and every case.17 The
Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new trial
because reversible error concerning the jury instructions occurred.18
The Seymore court erred in holding a judge must automatically instruct a jury
on the requirement of a voluntary act.19 This note will ﬁrst explain a voluntary act
and will thereafter examine the settled law prior to the Seymore decision.20 Next,
this note will look at the principal case and the court’s rationale in overruling the
trial court.21 Finally, this note will analyze and critique the court’s holding that a
Unfortunately, the jury was not instructed that it had to ﬁnd the failure to return
to have been voluntary. Without voluntary conduct, there is no mens rea.
)D (emphasis in original).
14

)D at 405.

15

)D at 406–07. "UT SEE INFRA note 18 and accompanying text (discussing failure to instruct
on an essential element is no longer an “error per se” and, in order to get case reversed on appeal, the
defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the non-instruction on the essential element).
16

See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.

17

See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.

18

Seymore, 152 P.2d at 411. The court held error occurred because the jury did not receive
adequate instruction “as to the mens rea element of the crime charged.” )D After Seymore, the
Wyoming Supreme Court decided Granzer v. State, 193 P.3d 266 (Wyo. 2008). That case turned
on “[w]hether the trial court committed reversible error by omitting statutory language from the
instruction on the elements of child endangerment” thereby requiring reversal based on the second
prong of the plain error test. )D at 268; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing
the plain error test). The court discussed how its precedent suggested automatic reversal once a
fundamental error occurs, such as when the trial court fails to instruct on an essential element, and
“once an error is established, reversal is warranted without regard to whether the error prejudiced the
defendant.” 'RANZER, 193 P.3d at 270. But the court went on to hold that a fundamental error is no
longer an “error per se” and “the defendant must show prejudice in order to warrant a reversal of his
conviction.” )D at 271–72. Furthermore, “failure to instruct properly on an element of a crime does
not constitute plain error where that element is not contested at trial, or where the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt is overwhelming.” )D at 270–71. However, the ruling in 'RANZER does not abrogate
the overall holding of Seymore. )D at 268–72. Indeed, a failure to instruct on voluntariness is still
a violation of “a clear and unequivocal rule of law,” because the Wyoming Supreme Court holds
voluntariness to be an essential element. Seymore, 152 P.3d at 404–06. 'RANZER simply states that,
on appeal, the defendant must now show the added requirement of prejudice in order to reverse his
conviction. 'RANZER, 193 P.3d at 272.
19

See infra notes 24–168 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 24–96 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 97–121 and accompanying text.
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trial judge must automatically instruct on voluntary act.22 Speciﬁcally, this note
will argue that the court came to the wrong conclusion and articulate why, as a
general rule, trial judges do not automatically instruct jurors on a voluntary act.23

BACKGROUND
%XPLANATION OF A 6OLUNTARY !CT
Regardless of how commentators deﬁne voluntariness, the Wyoming
Supreme Court, as well as other courts, agree the law does not punish individuals
for involuntary bodily movements.24 Without a doubt, Wyoming, as well as other
courts, recognizes a voluntary act as an indispensible prerequisite to criminal
liability.25 The notion of a voluntary act begins when the actor commits a
crime, because, in order to do so, the actor must do an act, or fail to do an act.26
Furthermore, the act or omission must be voluntary; otherwise, the defendant
may avoid liability.27 Voluntariness arises from “volition” which simply means
“a willed bodily movement.”28 Therefore, voluntariness exists as a minimum

22

See infra notes 122–68 and accompanying text.

23

)D

24

See, e.g., Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981) (holding a person who acts
involuntarily “does so without intent, exercise or free will, or knowledge of the acts”); Nelson v.
State, 927 P.2d 331, 333 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (stating “[e]very criminal offense must be
premised on some voluntary act or omission of the defendant”); Mooney v. State, 105 P.3d 149,
154 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (holding “a person cannot be held criminally liable unless that person
has performed a voluntary act”).
25

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, #ULPABLE !CTS OF 2ISK #REATION, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 375, 380 (2008) (stating that by “doing something” the “actor increase[s] the risk of harm
to others” and the “crime occurs when [the act] results in the [harm]”); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 126 (4th ed. 2007) (articulating that hACTUS express[es]
the voluntary physical movement in the sense of conduct and reus express[es] the fact that this
conduct results in a certain proscribed harm, i.e., that it ‘causes’ an injury to the legal interest
protected in that crime”) (quoting Albin Eser, 4HE 0RINCIPLE OF h(ARMv IN THE #ONCEPT OF #RIME !
#OMPARATIVE !NALYSIS OF THE #RIMINALLY 0ROTECTED ,EGAL )NTERESTS, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 386 (1965)).
26

27
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-201 (West 2008) (articulating “[t]he minimum
requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes
a voluntary act or omission to perform a duty by law which the person is physically capable of
performing”); ALA. CODE § 13A-2-3 (2008) (stating “[t]he minimum requirement for criminal
liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702200(1) (West 2008) (allowing a defense for any involuntary conduct or any involuntary omission);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-502 (West 2008) (stating “[t]he minimum requirement for criminal
liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing”).
28

See, e.g., Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 26, at 381 (articulating that “volition [means] the
defendant wills the movement of her body”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1309 (8th ed. 2005) (stating
that volition simply means “the ability to make a choice or determine something”); Takacs v. Engle,
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threshold for the imposition of criminal liability, and a willed bodily movement
satisﬁes the requirement of voluntariness.29
For example, if A practices target shooting at a shooting range and pulls the
trigger of his gun, and at the same time B walks in front of the gun and A’s
bullet strikes and kills B, A has committed the voluntary act of pulling the trigger,
regardless of whether he intended to kill B.30 By simply pulling the trigger, A wills
his bodily movement and thereby engages in a voluntary act.31 But a voluntary act
also encompasses a level of awareness and not only the physical act.32 Actually, the
law assumes a level of awareness on behalf of the actor and a capability on behalf
of the actor to will and control his actions, or refrain from acting.33 Thus, when A
pulls the trigger, an assumption exists that A chose to pull the trigger because of
A’s capability to control his action.34
Difﬁculties in deﬁning voluntariness have led some authorities to deﬁne
voluntariness negatively, by stating what actions do not constitute a voluntary
act.35 For example, if the defendant causes harm due to reﬂexes, convulsions, or
while sleeping, a voluntary act has not been committed because these actions
are not a “product” of the defendant’s mind.36 To illustrate, in -ARTIN V 3TATE,
the prosecutor charged Martin with appearing intoxicated in public; however,
the arresting police ofﬁcers “forcibly” carried the intoxicated Martin to a public
area.37 Consequently, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Martin’s
case because the manifestation of his drunkenness in public resulted from the

768 F.2d 122, 126 (Ohio 1985) (discussing that “[r]eﬂexes, convulsions, body movements during
unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actor’s
volition, are involuntary acts” (emphasis added)).
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-200, cmt. (West 2008) (stating the “minimum basis for the
imposition of penal liability . . . includes a voluntary act or voluntary omission”); see also supra note
27 and accompanying text.
29

30

DRESSLER ET AL., supra note 26, at 133 n.5.

31

See id.; see also supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.

32
Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., 'ENETICS AND 2ESPONSIBILITY 4O +NOW THE
Criminal from the Crime, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 142 (2006).
33

)D (emphasis added).

See supra notes 28–33; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(41) (deﬁning a voluntary act
as “a bodily movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination”); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 501.010 (Banks-Baldwin 2008) (stating “voluntary act means a bodily movement
performed consciously as a result of effort or determination”).
34

35

See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (West 2008) (deﬁning what are not voluntary
bodily movements: “(a) a reﬂex or convulsion; (b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or
sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement
that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or
habitual”).
36

37

17 So. 2d 427, 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).
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police ofﬁcers carrying him there and not from Martin’s voluntary determination
to appear in public.38 As a result, if the accused does not act voluntarily, he acts
due to “compulsion” and not from individual choice or control.39

*URY )NSTRUCTIONS ON 6OLUNTARY !CT
According to existing practice in Wyoming, courts generally do not instruct
juries on a voluntary act.40 To illustrate this point, one need only look at the
Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.41 It becomes evident that almost
none of the pattern instructions require proof of a voluntary act.42 No requirement
exists for trial courts to use the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.43
However, the pattern instructions and court precedent “advise” the courts and
practitioners in how to carefully draft jury instructions, and thereby correctly
instruct the jury.44
The pattern instructions show existing practice in Wyoming.45 For instance, the
Wyoming Supreme Court established aggravated homicide by vehicle as a general
intent crime.46 In reviewing the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction on
aggravated homicide by vehicle, the pattern instructions make no mention of
a voluntary act.47 Similarly, the court recognized aggravated assault and battery
with a deadly weapon as a general intent crime.48 The pattern instructions do not
mention voluntary act as an essential element.49 In other words, for most general
intent crimes, such as escape, the jury instructions do not mention voluntary act
as an essential element on which the trial judge must instruct.50

38

)D

39

Farahany & Coleman, supra note 32, at 143 (citing United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139,
1179 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
40

WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) (2004).

41

)D

42

)D

43

Reilly v. State, 55 P.3d 1259, 1267 n.7 (Wyo. 2002).

44

Tanner v. State, 57 P.3d 1242, 1248 (Wyo. 2002).

45

See infra note 46–50 and accompanying text.

46

Fleske v. State, 706 P.2d 257, 260 (Wyo. 1985).

47

WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 21.06B3 (2004).

48

Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 924 (Wyo. 1999).

49

WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 25.02B (2004).

50

WYOMING PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 52.06A (2004); see also supra notes

41–49.
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7HY #OURTS $O .OT )NSTRUCT ON 6OLUNTARINESS
Generally, courts do not instruct on voluntariness, sua sponte, because the
issue is simply not disputed.51 In essence, the issue of voluntariness is not litigated
unless the defendant “injects” it into the case.52 The Wyoming Supreme Court
recognized this concept in "ROOKS V 3TATE, in which the court acknowledged
insanity as an afﬁrmative defense requiring the defendant to inject the issue of
voluntariness into the case.53 The best explanation for why courts generally do
not instruct, sua sponte, on a voluntary act is the existence of a presumption of
voluntariness.54 This presumption rests on the proposition that human beings
have a certain level of “control over their behavior” and causing an action arises
from exercising this control.55 As the Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledged
in 0OLSTON V 3TATE, every man is presumed normal and in possession of “ordinary
faculties” unless the defendant proves otherwise.56 Therefore, on the basis of the
prosecution’s proof of the prohibited act, the jury presumes the defendant decided
to engage in this act because of the defendant’s inherent ability to control his
behavior and act voluntarily.57

51

-OONEY, 105 P.3d at 155. Sua sponte means “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own
motion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (8th ed. 2005). Thus, in this context, the judge does not
automatically instruct the jury on a voluntary act without any prompting or suggestion from either
of the parties. -OONEY, 105 P.3d at 155.
52
Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1176 (Ind. 1992) (reasoning “[i]n most cases there is no
issue of voluntariness and the State’s burden is carried by proof of commission of the act itself ”);
see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-200 cmt. (West 2008) (stating that “[generally,] the issue
of whether the defendant’s conduct includes a voluntary act or a voluntary omission will not be
separately litigated. . . . [I]nvoluntariness [is] a defense, [and] puts the ultimate burden on the
defendant to inject that issue into the case”).
53
706 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1985) (stating “[m]ental illness or deﬁciency is an afﬁrmative
defense which relieves an accused of responsibility for the crime he committed”).
54
See, e.g., Walker v. State, 652 P.2d 88, 91 (Alaska 1982) (articulating “[t]he law assumes
that every person intends the natural consequences of his voluntary acts”); see also infra notes 55–75
and accompanying text.
55

Farahany & Coleman, supra note 32, at 139 n.174. Stating
[c]riminal law provides that a criminal act may be attributed to the accused (and
therefore “voluntary”) by making two presuppositions: ﬁrst, individuals have
control over their behavior (legal free will), and second, a human agent causes the
actions he performs by the exercise of his capacities and control. Thus, one can
infer a defendant chose to act from proof that he engaged in the prohibited act.
Because criminal law allows this inference, the question whether the defendant
engaged voluntarily in an act does not usually arise.

)D
56

685 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo. 1984).

57

)D
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For example, Illinois deﬁnes armed robbery as a general intent crime and this
crime is proven if the evidence establishes an inference that “the prohibited result”
came about because of the defendant’s voluntary act.58 But, the state does not have
to independently prove voluntariness.59 The state simply presents evidence that
the defendant engaged in the prohibited act, by taking the victim’s belongings,
along with other facts sufﬁcient for the court to conclude that an armed robbery
took place.60 Unless there is any evidence to the contrary, the fact ﬁnder may then
infer that the defendant committed a voluntary act.61 Similarly, Alaska deﬁnes
rape as a general intent crime, which requires proof of a voluntary act.62 Here, the
state meets its burden if it proves the prohibited act—forced intercourse against
the victim’s will—and the state need not independently prove voluntariness.63
Except where the evidence raises any issue to the contrary, the jury may infer
the defendant intended all the consequences resulting from his voluntary act.64
Therefore, unless the defendant raises the issue of voluntariness and introduces
some relevant evidence to rebut the presumption, the defendant does not get an
instruction, sua sponte, on voluntariness.65
Difﬁculties arise when courts try to distinguish between essential elements
and presumed facts; yet, not all fundamental conditions to criminal liability
are essential elements.66 For example, in #LARK V !RIZONA the United States
Supreme Court held that sanity, a fundamental condition to criminal liability, is
presumed and does not constitute an essential element.67 #LARK established both a
presumption of sanity and allowed the presumption of a fundamental condition
to criminal liability.68 The Wyoming Supreme Court likewise allows for the
presumption of sanity and expressly rejects mental responsibility as an essential

58

People v. Jamison, 756 N.E.2d 788, 801 (Ill. 2001).

59

)D

60

)D

61

)D

62

7ALKER, 652 P.2d at 91.

63

)D

64

)D

65

-OONEY, 105 P.3d at 154–55 (holding the defendant did not raise the issue of voluntariness
and nothing in the record entitled the defendant to an automatic instruction on voluntariness);
Brown v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding the jury shall be charged
on the issue of voluntariness only when admitted evidence raises the issue of voluntariness and
the defendant requests the charge); State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337, 1338 (Ariz. 1995) (holding the
defendant not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary act because nothing in the evidence
indicated any involuntary bodily movements).
66

See infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.

67

Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (stating “[t]he presumption of sanity is equally
universal in some variety or other, being (at least) a presumption that a defendant has the capacity
to form the mens rea necessary for a verdict of guilt and the consequent criminal responsibility”).
68

)D
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element.69 Thus, while sanity, and the actor’s capability to act voluntarily, remains
a fundamental condition to the imposition of liability, the Wyoming Supreme
Court held sanity is not an essential element, but a presumption.70
To further stress this point, several jurisdictions, including Wyoming, allow a
defendant to raise the afﬁrmative defense of “unconsciousness” or “automatism.”71
Here, the court presumes consciousness when the accused commits the criminal
act, and, if the accused wants the jury to know otherwise, he must raise the
afﬁrmative defense of unconsciousness.72 As the Wyoming Supreme Court
stated in Fulcher v. State, the defense of unconsciousness or automatism exists
because a defendant, who performs actions unconsciously, performs these actions
involuntarily.73 But, unless the defendant invokes the unconsciousness defense,
a presumption of consciousness and voluntariness remains.74 In effect, courts
have repeatedly rejected consciousness as an essential element, but clearly view
consciousness and voluntariness as fundamental conditions to criminal liability.75

$EFENDANT -UST 2AISE 6OLUNTARINESS AS A $EFENSIVE )SSUE
A presumption, such as the voluntary act presumption, shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant.76 Under the burden of proof, the defendant carries
the burden of production, which means he must produce enough evidence on
69

"ROOKS, 706 P.2d at 667. Stating:
Mental responsibility is not an element of the offense charged. [Mental
responsibility] is an issue separate and apart from the essential element of the
criminal intent. Mental illness or deﬁciency is an afﬁrmative defense which relieves
an accused of responsibility for the crime he committed. Requiring the accused to
prove the afﬁrmative defense of mental illness or deﬁciency does not constitute a
shifting of the burden of proof to the accused to disprove an essential element of
the crime charged.

)D
70

)D

71

See, e.g., People v. Nihell, 77 P. 916 (Cal. 1904) (recognizing the unconsciousness defense);
Polston v. State, 685 P.2d 1 (Wyo. 1984) (recognizing the unconsciousness defense); State v. Caddell,
215 S.E.2d 348 (N.C. 1975) (recognizing the unconsciousness defense).
72
Nihell, 77 P. at 917 (stating “[m]en are presumed to be conscious when they act as if they
were conscious, and if they would have the jury know that things are not what they seem they must
impart that knowledge by afﬁrmative proof ”); sEE ALSO 0OLSTON, 685 P.2d at 6 (holding a person who
raises this defense “is presumed to be a person with a healthy mind [and] the burden is on the
defendant who raises the defense of automatism to prove the elements necessary to establish the
defense”); Caddell, 215 S.E.2d 348, 363 (holding the presumption that the defendant committed
the act voluntarily applies to the consciousness defense and “the burden rests upon the defendant to
establish this defense”).
73

633 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo. 1981).

74

See, e.g., 0OLSTON, 685 P.2d at 6; Nihell, 77 P. at 917; Caddell, 215 S.E.2d at 363.

75

See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.

76

JOHN W. STRONG ET. AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 520 (5th ed. 1999).
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the disputed issue to satisfy the judge, or the defendant carries the burden of
persuasion and must persuade the judge or jury regarding the correctness of a
disputed fact.77 A presumption may assign both burdens.78 After the defendant
meets his burden of proof the burden shifts to the opposing party to prove the
nonexistence of the particular fact.79
According to required procedure for an afﬁrmative defense in Wyoming, a
defendant must introduce some evidence before he receives a jury instruction on
the defensive issue.80 Also, the defendant must request an instruction from the
court.81 Since courts do not ordinarily instruct the jury on the requirement of
a voluntary act, but instead presume the defendant’s actions are voluntary, one
may infer the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect to this issue.82
Thus, at a minimum, the defendant must raise the issue of voluntariness and
must introduce some evidence, to the satisfaction of the judge, disputing the
voluntariness of his act; otherwise, the defendant does not get an automatic jury
instruction on voluntariness.83

4HE #ONSTITUTIONALLY 0ERMISSIBLE !LLOCATION OF 0ROOF
Requiring the defendant to raise the issue of voluntariness as an afﬁrmative
defense is constitutionally permissible.84 Certainly, the prosecution must prove all
facts that constitute the crime, but the prosecution need not prove every fact that
might affect “culpability or severity of punishment.”85 Accordingly, the burden
of proof regarding a particular issue may shift from the state to the defendant.86
77

)D § 336, at 508.

78

)D § 343, at 520.

79

)D § 342, at 518.

80

Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 964 (Wyo. 1998). If a defendant wants a jury instruction
on a defensive issue, he must timely submit a jury instruction that “correctly states the law and is
supported by the evidence.” )D Furthermore, statutes or case law must recognize the defense in the
jurisdiction. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 490 (Wyo. 1992).
81

/RTEGA, 966 P.2d at 964.

82

See supra notes 51–81 and accompanying text.

83

See, e.g., "ROOKS, 706 P.2d at 667; 0OLSTON, 685 P.2d at 6; see also Angelo v. State, 977 S.W.2d
169, 178 (Tex. App. 1998) (reasoning that “when the accused voluntarily engages in conduct that
includes a bodily movement sufﬁcient for the gun to discharge a bullet, ‘WITHOUT MORESUCH AS A
precipitation by another individual,’ a jury need not be charged on the voluntariness of the accused’s
conduct”) (quoting George v. State, 681 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1884)); State v. Sparks,
68 S.W.3d 6, 12 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating a defendant is entitled to an instruction on voluntariness
when “warranted by the evidence”).
84
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–06 (1977) (holding that shifting the burden of
proof of an afﬁrmative defense to the defendant is consistent with due process so long as the State
has the burden of proving “beyond a reasonable doubt ‘every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which [the defendant was] charged.’”).
85

)D at 204, 207.

86

)D at 203 n.9 (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Vol. 5, §§ 2486, 2512).
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While the prosecution bears the burden of proof regarding every essential element
of the crime charged, the defendant carries the burden of proving an afﬁrmative
defense.87 However, a presumption cannot shift the burden of proof to the extent
that it places upon the defendant the burden of proving, or disproving, an essential
element of the crime as deﬁned by the legislature.88 Rather, the afﬁrmative defense
must be a “separate issue” where the accused carries the burden of proof.89
To illustrate, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in State v. Jones, upheld
the constitutionality of forcing the defendant to raise voluntariness as a defensive
issue.90 In that case, Jones challenged the jury instructions arguing they required
him to disprove the voluntariness of his acts, thereby relieving the state of its
burden to prove an essential element of the crime.91 Speciﬁcally, Jones argued the
trial court erred when it instructed the jury that the defendant had the burden
of establishing the unconsciousness defense.92 In support of his argument, Jones
argued the court should apply the holding of -ULLANEY V 7ILBUR, in which the
United States Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to place the burden on the
defendant to disprove an essential element.93

87

0ROOF )SSUES, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 652, 657 (2008).

88

0ATTERSON, 432 U.S. at 208. In this case, the state charged Patterson under a New York
statute which did not have malice aforethought as “an element of the crime,” but permitted “a
person accused of murder to raise an afﬁrmative defense that he ‘acted under the inﬂuence of extreme
emotional disturbance.’” )D at 198. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality
of the New York statute because it did not require the defendant to disprove an essential element;
rather, it simply allowed the defendant to raise an afﬁrmative defense. )D at 201. The United States
Supreme Court afﬁrmed the holding because once the state proves all essential elements “beyond
a reasonable doubt” the defendant may then raise an afﬁrmative defense as long as the defense
“does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict
of murder.” )D at 201, 206–07. Consequently, 0ATTERSON stands for the proposition that “essential
elements” just means those identiﬁed by the legislature as elements of the offense and something is
not an element of the offense unless the legislature makes it one. )D
89

)D at 207. Yet, no violation of due process exists simply because evidence used to prove an
afﬁrmative defense also shows the existence or nonexistence of an essential element as long as the
state still has the ultimate burden of proof regarding that element. 0ROOF )SSUES, supra note 87, at 657
(citing Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987)).
90

527 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).

91

)D at 706.

92

)D

93

)D (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)). In -ULLANEY, the state charged the
defendant under a statute which required the defendant to prove that “he acted in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation in order to reduce the murder [charge] to manslaughter.” -ULLANEY, 421
U.S. at 688–91. The Court reasoned that since malice aforethought was “a critical fact in dispute”
it would be unconstitutional to place the burden on the defendant to disprove malice by showing
that he acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation. )D at 701, 703. On the contrary,
due process “requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation” and the Court ultimately held that “it was unconstitutional for a
state to require a defendant to negate a required element of an offense.” )D at 704, 707.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed and distinguished the issue in
Jones’ case from -ULLANEY because the prosecution still had the burden of proving
all essential elements of the crime charged.94 Therefore, the jury instructions did
not require Jones disprove an essential element; rather, they merely required that
he raise an afﬁrmative defense to overcome the presumption of the voluntariness
of his acts.95 Since a voluntary act is not an essential element, it is constitutionally
permissible to place the burden on the defendant to prove the involuntariness of
his actions and the trial court can instruct the jury to that effect.96

PRINCIPAL CASE
On June 2, 2004, Brian Seymore did not return to the Frontier Corrections
System as required and such a violation constituted escape.97 Seymore recognized
his violation and tried to turn himself in; however, the jail declined to take him
without an arrest warrant.98 Eventually, authorities arrested and charged Seymore
with escape and a jury subsequently convicted Seymore.99

-AJORITY /PINION #HIEF *USTICE 6OIGT JOINED BY *USTICES +ITE AND "URKE
The issue on appeal for the Wyoming Supreme Court turned on whether
the trial judge “misinformed” the jury regarding the intent element of escape.100
Seymore alleged error occurred because the trial judge did not instruct the jury as
to the essential element of mens rea.101 Speciﬁcally, Seymore argued the trial court
erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the speciﬁc intent necessary for the
crime of escape.102 The court held the trial judge incorrectly informed the jury
regarding the mens rea element of escape and subsequently reversed and remanded
for new trial.103
First, the court reviewed this case under the plain error standard because
Seymore did not object to the jury instructions at trial.104 Second, the court
addressed Seymore’s argument that escape was a speciﬁc intent crime and rejected

94

Jones, 527 S.E.2d at 707.

95

)D at 706–07.

96

See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text.

97

Seymore v. State, 152 P.3d 401, 403 (Wyo. 2007).

98

)D

99

)D

100

)D

101

)D at 405.

102

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 405.

103

)D at 411.

104

)D at 404; see also note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the plain error standard).
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the argument because previous cases established escape as a general intent crime.105
As a result, the court found the non-instruction on the speciﬁc intent element
correct.106 Nevertheless, the court held the jury instructions insufﬁcient because,
even for a general intent crime, the state must prove the voluntariness of the
actor’s criminal conduct.107
In its reasoning, the court recognized mens rea as an essential element to
almost every crime charged, and since the court equated voluntariness with mens
rea, an actor is not criminally responsible for his actions unless the state proves
he acted voluntarily.108 Therefore, the Seymore court found instructing a jury on
the voluntary act requirement as paramount; otherwise, the trial court commits
reversible error.109 Read broadly, this holding implies that a trial judge must now
instruct on a voluntary act in each and every case, and if it does not, the case is
subject to reversal.110
Although the holding on the ﬁrst issue required reversal, the Wyoming
Supreme Court also addressed a second issue which turned on whether the
prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct.111 Seymore alleged nine such
instances and the court found the “cumulative effect” of these instances also
required reversal.112

$ISSENTING /PINION *USTICE (ILL
Justice Hill’s analysis began by recognizing no argument of voluntariness
appeared in Seymore’s brief; consequently, the court raised the issue for Seymore
and framed his argument on appeal.113 The dissent noted that, as a general rule,
the court should not deﬁne the scope of the appellant’s argument nor raise an
issue for him; on the contrary, the defendant himself must meet this obligation.114
As Justice Hill argued, Seymore neglected to establish and argue the issue of
105

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 406 (citing Slaughter v. State, 629 P.2d 481, 483 (Wyo. 1981)).

106

)D

107

)D (quoting Rowe v. State, 974 P.2d 937, 939 (Wyo. 1999)).

108

)D at 405–06.

109

)D at 407. A fundamental error, which requires reversal, occurs when the trial judge does
not instruct the jury as to all the essential elements of the crime charge. )D "UT SEE SUPRA note 18 and
accompanying text (discussing that the defendant must now also show prejudice before a reversal is
warranted).
110

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 407.

111

)D at 403, 407.

112

)D at 407–11. The discussion of prosecutorial misconduct is not part of this case note and
will not be addressed.
113

)D at 411 (Hill, J., dissenting).

114

)D (Hill, J., dissenting) (citing Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 622 (Wyo. 1993) (Golden,
J., concurring)).
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voluntariness on appeal, which forfeits “any claim of error.”115 Therefore, the court
overstepped its boundaries when it framed the issue for Seymore on appeal.116

$ISSENTING /PINION *USTICE 'OLDEN
In a second dissenting opinion, Justice Golden disagreed with the majority
and argued the statute deﬁnes a strict liability crime and not a general intent
crime.117 Justice Golden argued the legislature purposely created the escape statute
without including a mens rea element.118 To support this argument, Justice Golden
referred to a different statute which requires a showing of intentional conduct in
its deﬁnition of “escape from a work release program.”119 Therefore, according to
Justice Golden, the statute applicable to Seymore’s case deﬁnes a strict liability
crime; otherwise, the legislature would have included an intentional act as it did
with the other escape statute.120 Justice Golden concluded that the trial judge
correctly barred a jury instruction on mens rea as an essential element of the crime
of escape.121

ANALYSIS
The Wyoming Supreme Court erroneously held that trial judges must
automatically instruct juries on a voluntary act.122 This section will discuss several
arguments in support of the proposition that the court erred in its holding and will
articulate why trial judges usually do not instruct a jury, sua sponte, on a voluntary
act.123 First, a presumption of voluntariness exists and the court disregarded
its own precedent establishing this presumption.124 Second, a presumption of
voluntariness shifts the burden of proof to the defendant; however, nothing in
the record indicates Seymore introduced any evidence alleging his actions were
involuntary.125 Lastly, it makes sense not to instruct jurors, sua sponte, on a
voluntary act because such an instruction causes great jury confusion.126

115

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 411 (Hill, J., dissenting).

116

)D (Hill, J., dissenting).

117

)D (Golden, J., dissenting).

118

)D (Golden, J., dissenting).

119

)D (Golden, J. dissenting) (arguing Wyoming Statute § 7-16-309 “deﬁnes an escape from
a work release program to require an ‘intentional act’”).
120

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 411 (Golden, J. dissenting).

121

)D (Golden, J., dissenting).

122

See infra notes 127–68 and accompanying text.

123

)D

124

See infra notes 127–40 and accompanying text.

125

See infra notes 141–51 and accompanying text.

126

See infra notes 152–68 and accompanying text.
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0RESUMPTION OF 6OLUNTARINESS %XISTS
Defendants continuously try to argue the burden is on the state to prove
they acted voluntarily.127 Nevertheless, several jurisdictions recognize that even
though a voluntary act is a minimum requirement for the imposition of criminal
liability, a jury may infer the voluntariness of the defendant’s actions.128 Unless
there is evidence to the contrary, the defendant does not receive an instruction on
voluntariness.129 Yet, the Seymore court found instructing a jury on the voluntary
act requirement essential to withstand a conviction because the court equated
voluntariness with an essential element.130 This is clearly erroneous considering
the vast amount of authority rejecting voluntariness as an essential element.131
Indeed, the court even ignores its own precedent which allows for the presumption
of voluntariness.132
For example, "ROOKS V 3TATE allows for a presumption of sanity and places
upon the defendant the burden to prove his actions were involuntary.133 0OLSTON
v. State speciﬁcally states every man is presumed “normal” and in possession of
ordinary sense and a defendant who raises an involuntariness defense must prove
otherwise.134 Furthermore, Fulcher v. State allows the presumption of voluntariness
and places the burden on the defendant to prove he acted involuntarily by asserting
the defense of unconsciousness.135 In short, Wyoming precedent allows for the
presumption of voluntariness and requires the defendant raise the involuntariness
defense.136 No doubt, Seymore contradicts the proposition that previous cases allow
127

State v. Lara, 902 P.2d 1337, 1338–39 (Ariz. 1995); State v. Baird, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1176
(Ind. 1992); Mooney v. State, 105 P.3d 149, 154–55 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
128

Walker v. State, 652 P.2d 88, 91 (Alaska 1982); People v. Jamison, 756 N.E.2d 788, 801
(Ill. 2001); "AIRD, 604 N.E.2d at 1176.
129

Polston v. State, 685 P.2d 1, 6 (Wyo. 1984); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 147 (Wyo.
1981); Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1985) (recognizing the insanity defense); Lara, 902
P.2d at 1338; "AIRD, 604 N.E.2d at 1176; -OONEY, 105 P.3d at 154–55; 7ALKER, 652 P.2d at 91.
130

Seymore v. State, 152 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2007).

131

See, e.g., Farahany & Coleman, supra note 32, at 139 n.174 (articulating the criminal law
allows the inference that individuals can control their behavior and causes their actions “by the
exercise of [their] capacities and control. Thus, one can infer a defendant chose to act from proof
that he engaged in the prohibited act. Because criminal law allows this inference, the question
whether the defendant engaged voluntarily in an act does not usually arise”); Clark v. Arizona,
548 U.S. 735, 766 (2006) (allowing for the presumption of sanity); -OONEY, 105 P.3d at 154–55
(holding a voluntary act fundamental to criminal liability, but the defendant must raise the issue;
otherwise, no jury instruction is given).
132

See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.

133

706 P.2d at 667.

134

685 P.2d at 6.

135

633 P.2d at 145, 147.

136

Eric A. Johnson, 4HE #RIME 4HAT 7ASNT 4HERE 7YOMINGS %LUSIVE 3ECOND $EGREE -URDER
Statute, 7 WYO. L. REV. 1, 13–20 (2007) (articulating a presumption of voluntariness and stating
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for the presumption of voluntariness; yet, the Seymore court, without discussing
or explicitly overruling these cases, implicitly held a voluntary act as an essential
element to every crime charged.137
When the Wyoming Supreme Court reviews jury instructions on appeal,
with no objection given at trial, the court will uphold the jury instructions as
long as the trial court correctly presented the law to the jurors and included in
the instructions all relevant issues introduced at trial.138 According to previous
discussion, established law in Wyoming prior to Seymore required the defendant
to raise the issue of voluntariness and the defendant did not automatically get a
jury instruction on voluntariness.139 In this regard, the trial judge in Seymore did
not commit plain error and the trial judge gave the jury adequate instructions
because no requirement existed, sua sponte, to instruct the jurors on a voluntary
act.140

0RESUMPTION OF 6OLUNTARINESS 3HIFTS THE "URDEN OF 0ROOF
Another argument supporting the proposition that the Wyoming Supreme
Court incorrectly decided Seymore arises from the fact that a presumption shifts
the burden of proof.141 This means the defendant must raise an afﬁrmative defense
and, at the very least, produce some evidence.142 In Seymore, the statute relevant to
the crime charged does not mention a voluntary act; subsequently, voluntariness
is neither statutorily deﬁned as an essential element, nor as a statutory defense.143
Accordingly, one must assume the legislature intended to retain the common law
defense of involuntariness.144 In these cases, a presumption of voluntariness exists
and the Wyoming Supreme Court has allocated at least the burden of production,
“the Wyoming courts impose on the defendant the burden of raising the ‘defense’ of involuntariness
and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his acts were performed
involuntarily”).
137

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 406–07; see also supra notes 12–17, 108–10 and accompanying text
(articulating the Wyoming Supreme Court recognizes mens rea as an essential element to almost
every crime charged, and since the court equates voluntariness with mens rea, an actor is not
criminally liable for his actions unless the state proves he acted voluntarily). Therefore, Seymore
implicitly stands for the proposition that trial courts must now instruct on a voluntary act in each
and every case because, according to the court, voluntariness is an essential element. Seymore, 153
P.3d at 406–07.
138

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 404.

139

See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.

140

)D As already articulated, cases such as "ROOKS, 706 P.2d at 667, 0OLSTON, 685 P.2d at 6, and
Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 145, 147, allow for the presumption of voluntariness and place the burden on
the defendant to raise the issue of voluntariness in order to receive a jury instruction. )D
141

STRONG ET. AL., supra note 76, § 343, at 520.

142

)D § 336, at 508.

143

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-102(b) (West 2008) (stating “[c]ommon law defenses are retained
unless otherwise provided by this act”).
144
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and sometimes the burden of persuasion, in regard to the voluntariness defense.145
Thus, according to Wyoming, and other jurisdictions, the defendant bears at least
the burden of production on the issue of voluntariness before he receives a jury
instruction.146 However, no indication appeared from the record that Seymore
argued the involuntariness of his bodily movements nor did he introduce any
evidence at trial on the matter.147
Additionally, nothing in the record indicated Seymore failed to return to FCS
involuntarily.148 No evidence emerged that Seymore failed to return to FCS due
to a car accident, disabling injuries, or a natural misfortune such as being tied
down or drugged.149 Nonetheless, the court injected the issue of voluntariness,
contrary to precedent, and thereby framed the issue for Seymore.150 This is
certainly inconsistent with prior decisions and creates unpredictability for future
litigation as to who injects the issue of voluntariness: the defendant, the state, or
the court?151

!UTOMATIC *URY )NSTRUCTION ON 6OLUNTARINESS -AY #AUSE #ONFUSION
A ﬁnal argument supporting the position that the Wyoming Supreme Court
erred in its holding arises from the notion that an automatic instruction on a
voluntary act causes jury confusion.152 For example, in 0EOPLE V "UI, the Appellate
Court of Illinois held the lower court properly denied a jury instruction requiring
an instruction on a voluntary act, because little evidence indicated the defendant
acted involuntarily. 153 Furthermore, the disputed issue at trial did not center on
voluntariness, so the proposed jury instructions would have only contributed to
jury confusion because of the uncertain signiﬁcance of including voluntariness
in the instructions.154 In other words, if the defendant does not raise the issue of

145

)D; see e.g., 0OLSTON, 685 P.2d at 6 (placing the burden on the defendant to prove the
defense); "ROOKS, 706 P.2d at 667 (“requiring the accused to prove the afﬁrmative defense of mental
illness or deﬁciency”); Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 147 (holding “the burden rests upon the defendant to
establish this defense”).
146
See, e.g., "ROOKS, 706 P.2d at 667; Fulcher, 633 P.2d at 147; -OONEY 105 P.3d at 155; Brown
v. State, 955 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Jones, 527 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000).
147

Seymore, 152 P.3d at 411 (Hill, J., dissenting).

148

)D at 403–05.

149

)D

150

)D at 411 (Hill, J., dissenting) (arguing there was no indication from the record that
Seymore raised the issue of voluntariness).
151

See supra notes 141–50 and accompanying text.

152

See infra notes 153–68 and accompanying text.

153

885 N.E.2d 506, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).

154

)D
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voluntariness himself, the jurors likely become confused as to why they have to
consider the issue at all.155
The Alaska Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion in Nelson v. State.156
In that case, the jury instruction given at trial turned on whether the defendant
recklessly caused the result of an assault.157 On appeal, Nelson objected to this
instruction because the trial judge did not require a ﬁnding that Nelson engaged
in the conduct “knowingly.”158 Thus, according to Nelson, not only should the
state have proved her recklessness in causing the result, but the state also should
have proved she acted knowingly or voluntarily.159
In its brief, the prosecution agreed that the assault statutes, which charged
Nelson for her criminal conduct, contained the implied “requirement” that the
conduct be undertaken knowingly or voluntarily.160 However, the state argued a
separate instruction on voluntariness was unnecessary, because by determining
recklessness the jury also determines a sequence of acts including the defendant’s
awareness and voluntariness of these acts.161 Any further instruction on recklessness
would have only served to confuse the jurors because they understood the
“everyday use” and ordinary meaning of the word reckless.162 The Alaska Court of
Appeals agreed and upheld the instructions given at trial.163 The court reasoned
that since the issue turned on whether Nelson recklessly caused the result, jurors
“will approach their task correctly if they are told the statutory meaning of . . .
recklessly.”164
The concept of voluntariness appears difﬁcult even for judges, practitioners,
and commentators to understand; therefore, it is unfair to expect jurors to
understand voluntariness. Furthermore, without some conduct to attach

155

)D

156

927 P.2d 331 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). In that case, Nelson went to a Sears store to satisfy
her “compulsive urge to shoplift.” )D at 331. A security guard (Davis) followed Nelson and her
companion (Matthews) into the parking lot where he confronted Nelson. )D at 332. A scufﬂe arose
and another security guard (Jasso) arrived at the scene to help out Davis. )D Nelson decided to get in
her truck; she put her truck in drive and after three attempts of driving towards the men, she ﬁnally
succeeded in running over Jasso, causing bodily injury, and, at the same time, causing Davis to fear
for his life. )D
157

)D at 333.

158

Brief for Appellee at 11, Nelson v. Alaska, 927 P.2d 331 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (No.
A–5688).
159

)D

160

)D

161

)D at 12.

162

)D at 13–14.

163

Nelson, 927 P.2d at 334.

164

)D at 333–34, 334 n.4.
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voluntariness to, the jury will likely be confused as to what conduct it has to ﬁnd
voluntary or involuntary.165 Additionally, how does that conduct interact with the
requisite mental state such as recklessness?166 As becomes evident from the state’s
brief in Nelson, the jury already considers a sequence of acts and uses common
sense to determine the voluntariness of these acts.167 Therefore, a separate jury
instruction on voluntariness is unnecessary.168

CONCLUSION
The Wyoming Supreme Court erred in holding that juries must automatically
be instructed on a voluntary act.169 In deciding Seymore, the Wyoming Supreme
Court passed down a landmark decision because it dramatically changes existing
practice of not instructing jurors on a voluntary act in the State of Wyoming.170
Furthermore, Seymore will undoubtedly cause great impairment because of its
likelihood to confuse judges, practitioners and jurors alike.171 Unfortunately, this
fundamental change in Wyoming’s criminal law was based on a hasty decision by
the Wyoming Supreme Court and the court misspoke when it said a voluntary act
is an essential element which requires an automatic jury instruction.172

165
"UI, 885 N.E.2d at 531; Nelson, 927 P.2d at 333–34, 334 n.4; Brief for Appellee, supra
note 158, at 11–14.
166

See supra note 165 and accompanying text.

167

See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.

168

See supra notes 152–67 and accompanying text.

169

See supra notes 24–168 and accompanying text

170

See supra notes 127–51 and accompanying text.

171

See supra notes 152–68 and accompanying text.

172

See supra notes 127–51 and accompanying text.
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